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My name is Michael Greenberger.
I want to thank the committee for inviting me to testify on the important issue that is the
subject of today’s hearings.
After nearly 24 years in private legal practice, I served as the Director of the Division of
Trading and Markets (“T&M”) at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”) from September 1997 to September 1999. During my tenure at the CFTC, I
worked extensively on regulatory issues concerning exchange traded energy derivatives,
the legal status of OTC derivatives, and the CFTC authorization of computerized trading
of foreign exchange derivative products on computer terminals in the United States.
I now serve as a Professor at the University of Maryland School of Law. At the law
school, I have, inter alia, focused my attention on financial derivatives, including
academic writing and speaking on this subject, as well as serving as a media
commentator on the role of financial derivatives in major recent financial scandals,
including the failure of Enron and the Western electricity market manipulation of 20012002. Besides addressing these issues in a variety of commercial and financial regulatory
law courses, I have designed a new course focused exclusively on financial derivatives,
which I will teach at the law school this coming academic year.
In examining the question of the cause of the high gasoline products, it is useful to
remember that as of January 2002, the cost of oil, the major component of gasoline, was
@ $18 a barrel1; by the end of 2005, it had risen to @ $502; and, by April 21, 2006, the
price had reached an all time high of $75.17.3 The resulting $3.00 plus per gallon cost of
gas (with prospects for a further dramatic rise) has clearly been a source of anxiety and
hardship to the American people, especially aggravated by the prediction of many
prominent analysts that that price of oil could soon rise to over $100 a barrel.4
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A fierce debate now rages about whether this price increase is caused exclusively by
economic fundamentals or whether some form of market manipulation, having nothing to
do with market fundamentals, is contributing substantially to this sudden price spike.
The arguments on behalf of the “economic fundamentalists” have been well rehearsed:
e.g., the price of oil has gone up because there is an oil shortage due to, inter alia, the
lack of refinery capacity and oil reserves in the United States; the negligible pace of
developing alternative supplies of fuel or conserving the use of oil; the phenomenal
growth of China’s and India’s economies (and thus their corresponding increased
dependence on oil); and destabilizing world events, including the decline in oil
production in Iraq caused by the insurgency and international difficulties with such major
oil producing countries as Iran and Venezuela.
No one now seriously disputes the fact that these economic circumstances are a
significant contributor to the increase in the price of oil and the corresponding increase in
gasoline. What is troubling, however, is the argument that has been vigorously advanced
in many quarters that market manipulation has nothing to do with this price spike.
The “economic fundamentalists” not only argue that market manipulation plays no role in
these phenomenal price increases, but, despite the absence of complete and meaningful
data, they assert that this question is so frivolous that it bears no comprehensive factual
investigation.
It is my judgment that much can be discerned by the stakeholders that support each side
of these arguments. It is the oil industry5, the banks and the hedge funds6, and free
market-oriented financial regulators who contend that market manipulation plays no role
in this price run up.7 Of course, the private institutions arguing against manipulation (or
even a meaningful factual inquiry into possible manipulation) have much to gain from
these rapid price increases.
It is the large industrial users of energy related commodities,8 including the agriculture
community, consumer groups9, and the state attorneys general and governors,10 who are
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either convinced of, or seriously concerned about, the role that market manipulation
plays. These groups, of course, are either paying for the cost of the price spikes or are
hearing from constituents who find these prices intolerable.
Moreover, recent history suggests that the question of market manipulation is ripe for
investigation.
It is the now established beyond doubt that manipulation of futures and derivatives
contracts dramatically increased the market price of electricity in the Western United
States during 2001-2002, including the needless cause of widespread blackouts or rolling
blackouts and a surge in corporate bankruptcies during that time period.11
The May 2002 legislative record pertaining to Senators Feinstein’s and Cantwell’s
unsuccessful attempt to enact legislation that would have allowed governmental access to
manipulation data in these otherwise largely opaque markets succinctly summarizes the
regulatory and economic record. It shows that “gaming” energy derivatives markets
drove up the cost of electricity in a manner that bore no relationship to underlying
economic fundamentals.
For example, in 1999 the cost of electricity within the State of California was @ $7
billion.12 Yet, by 2000 the state-wide cost had risen to @ $27 billion and @ $26.7 billion
in 2001.13 “The state’s electricity bill rose by more than $40 billion, the state budget was
stripped of another $6 billion, and the state’s two major utilities—Pacific Gas & Electric
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and Southern California Edison—wound up seeking another $13 billion in relief from the
courts.”14
The contemporaneous explanation at that time – as it is today with the price of oil – was
that this sudden and highly disruptive price spike was caused by economic fundamentals.
As a result, California and other Western states, as well as pubic authorities and
industries within those states dependent on electricity and natural gas supplies, entered
into long term supply contracts for prices that vastly exceeded what history would prove
was the market’s fundamental equilibrium.
As Senator Cantwell showed during the May 2002 legislative debate, Bonneville Power
Administration, for example, entered into long term supply contracts with Enron for $700
million during the electricity crisis, which by March 2002 “would only cost $350 million.
That means BPA—and that means, ultimately, Washington state ratepayers, who have to
pay for these energy costs are paying Enron $350 million more than the contract market
value.”15
Largely through voluntary disclosure by Enron’s Portland attorneys (and not by any
regulatory investigative efforts), December 2000 memos were uncovered outlining 11
trading strategies employed by Enron’s Portland, Ore., office in the California power
market.16 The strategies, with nicknames such as ``Fat Boy'' and ``Death Star,'' involved
manipulation within the then recently deregulated OTC energy derivatives market,
including the notorious use of “wash trades,” having no other economic purpose than
driving up the spot price of electricity in the Western United States.17
Only after these memos were uncovered in April-May 2002 did the CFTC begin serious
investigations into these markets. Prior to that time, that agency’s leadership was assuring
Congress and the public (as it is today in the case of soaring gas prices) that the rising
price of electricity was purely a matter of market fundamentals.18 Indeed, because much
of the manipulation in that case occurred in the OTC energy derivatives market, which
had been removed from CFTC jurisdiction by Congress in December 2000 with the
CFTC’s active encouragement, the CFTC in early 2002 had argued (in a manner that
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ultimately turned out to be inaccurate in critical respects19) that it had no jurisdiction to
investigate the manipulation.
As it turned out, despite the well-established understanding that electricity consumers in
Western states lost tens of billions of dollars, the CFTC’s resulting investigation led to
the assessment of only $300 million in damages or fines for this widespread, devastating,
and costly futures and derivatives market manipulation.20
Given the obvious parallels between the electricity price spikes of 2001-2002 and the
current soaring price increases in oil and gasoline, it would seem to a matter of
elementary logic to want to examine data relating that the super-heated oil futures and
derivatives markets.
It should be added that the view of House and Senate Republicans appears to represent
more than mild intellectual curiosity about these kinds of matters. On December 14,
2005, the House passed its version of the CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2005 (H.R.
4473), which included a Title II21, mandating an aggressive regulatory posture by the
CFTC in overseeing possible manipulation of “any contract market” engaged in the
trading of natural gas futures and derivatives, including increased reporting of large
trading positions involving natural gas. At that juncture, the cost of natural gas had
“float[ed] at a high near $14 MMBtu.”22 (Their mere threat of aggressive disclosure in
these markets may very well be responsible for the substantial decline in natural gas
prices after that House action.23 )
Moreover, in Speaker Hastert’s and Majority Leader Frist’s April 24, 2006 letter to
President Bush concerning high gasoline prices, they expressly “request[ed] that [the
President] direct the Chairman of the [CFTC] to bring heightened scrutiny to the trading
of energy futures and derivatives to determine whether spikes in prices of oil, gasoline
and other petroleum distillates are a result of improper market manipulation by traders or
energy firms.”24
However, as was true with regard to the electricity manipulation in early 2002, the federal
government is virtually placed in the position of begging most energy futures traders to
provide the government with meaningful and relevant trading data.
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The reason for this weak regulatory posture was the passage in December 2000 of the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act (“CFMA”), which was an over a 262 page bill
added at the last minute on the Senate Floor by then Senate Finance Chairman Gramm to
an over 11,000 page consolidated appropriation bill for FY 2001.25
Contrary to the express recommendation of the President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets,26 the CFMA for all practical purposes exempted from CFTC and all other
federal regulation the over-the-counter (OTC) energy derivative markets.27 While this
legislation retained CFTC authority to investigate fraud and manipulation in OTC energy
markets,28 the CFTC, as a practical matter, has read this legislation as constricting its
authority to call for regular OTC energy reporting in the absence of pre-existing
demonstrative evidence of manipulation.
While much attention has been paid to the CFMA’s deregulation of the OTC derivatives
markets, two further deregulatory measures within that statute are relevant for purposes
of the present inquiry.
First, with regard to traditional future exchanges, the CFMA “replace[d] the CFTC’s
prior regulatory approach with one based on the satisfaction of a set of [18] core
principles.”29 These principles are quite general in nature.30 “The Act provides that the
contract market has reasonable discretion in establishing the manner in which it complies
with the core principles.”31 As a result, two distinguished commentators have observed:
“The CFMA decreased significantly the degree of market
regulation over designated contract markets. Rather than affirmative dayto-day regulation that was imposed under the former regulatory regime,
under the . . . CFMA, the [CFTC] is charged with an oversight role with
respect to contract markets.”32
Quite simply, rather than have the exchange seek approval for material changes in its
activities, the new law obliged the exchange merely to notify the CFTC of such changes,
placing a substantial evidentiary burden on the CFTC to enjoin wrongdoing after the
fact.33
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Not satisfied with the substantial deregulation of the traditional exchanges, the drafters of
the CFMA went on to offer the further deregulatory option of creating “designated
transaction execution facilities” [(‘DTEF’s’] with even less of a regulatory overseer than
is the case with contract markets.”34 Suffice it to say for present purposes, by limiting
slightly the kinds of customers eligible to trade on such a facility, as well as the kinds of
contracts to be traded, the CFMA affords the CFTC even less regulatory control over
DTEF’s than applies to traditional contract markets. For example, DTEF’s need comply
with only eight highly general regulatory “core principles,” rather than the 18 applicable
to conventional markets.35
Second, besides the deregulatory effect of the CFMA and that statute’s contribution to the
opaqueness of the OTC energy futures and derivatives transactions, there is an informal
CFTC process that has recently evolved into a further obstacle to market manipulation:
CFTC staff no action letters permitting Foreign Boards of Trade (“FBOT’s”) the right to
allow their members to trade FBOT products on computer terminals located in the U.S.
In February 1996, the CFTC Division of Trading and Markets (“T&M”), in what
appeared at the time to be an action of little consequence, authorized the German futures
exchange, then called the Deutsche Terminborse (DTB), to allow its members to trade
DTB contracts on computer terminals within the U.S.36 In what was a surprise to almost
everyone, the privilege granted to DTB resulted in a substantial upsurge in that
exchange’s business. Shortly thereafter, virtually all of the world’s FBOT’s desired U.S.
trading privileges similar to that of DTB.
Recognizing the substantial trading that would be done under these orders, the CFTC first
tried to establish a Commission rule that would govern approvals of these foreign
exchanges.37 When the Commissioners could not promptly settle on such a rule and
because of the need to level the playing field in terms of giving other foreign exchanges
the rights given to DTB, it was decided that T&M would continue to oversee these
approvals through the no action letter process.38
As a result, on July 23, 1999, I signed a no action letter that permitted the principal U.K.
futures exchange, LIFFE, the same rights that had earlier been afforded to DTB.39 There
followed a series of similar no action letters (almost all signed after I left the Commission
in September 1999) for other foreign exchanges, including the exchange most relevant to
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the present enquiry: the U.K.’s International Petroleum Exchange (“IPE”),40
subsequently purchased by the U.S.-based Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”) in 2001.41
It is important to stress that each of these no action letters were filled with standard
conditions carefully confining the regulatory right afforded. Each of the FBOT’s had to
be regulated by a foreign governmental entity whose regulatory format was akin to that of
the CFTC. 42 Assurances had to be received from the FBOT that meaningful information
about trades would be provided the CFTC, especially in situations where there was a
concern about market manipulation. Information sharing arrangements had to be in place
assuring the CFTC that the foreign regulatory authority overseeing the FBOT would
provide relevant information to the CFTC promptly upon request.43 Even more
important, a condition was written into these no action letters that the FBOT itself would
“provide, upon the request of the [CFTC], the . . .Department of Justice, and, if
appropriate the NFA, prompt access to original books and records maintained at their
United States offices . . .”44
Moreover, in these no action letters, “the [CFTC’s] ability to bring appropriate action for
fraud or manipulation” was retained.45 The no action letters also specified the contracts
that could be traded under the approval.46 Until quite recently, those contracts were
always foreign based and not in direct conflict with contracts traded on U.S. exchanges.
Under the original “no action” template, the FBOT had to seek affirmative approval of
T&M before it could list new contract under the no action process.47 In July 2000, that
policy was changed to allow FBOT’s to list new contracts upon simple notice to the
CFTC.48
Finally, the CFTC authority was “retain[ed] to condition further, modify, suspend,
terminate, or otherwise restrict the terms of the no-action relief provided herein, in [the
agency’s] discretion.”49
Two further points need to be emphasized about FBOT approval. When the no action
approval process was instituted July 1999, there was considerable sensitivity to not
undercut U.S. exchanges that were fully compliant and under the regulatory control of the
CFTC. By requiring the foreign exchange to list the contracts it would market under the
no action letter and by further requiring the exchange to return to the CFTC if it wanted
to add new contracts, it was well understood that T&M was not going to allow a foreign
40
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exchange to market contracts that were directly competitive to the those offered by U.S.
exchanges. Second, it was further well understood that the no action process was for
exchanges that were organized in foreign countries. It was never contemplated that the no
action process would apply where a foreign exchange was owned by a U.S. entity.
Therefore, at least at the implementation of the FBOT no action process, either the
introduction of products that were in direct competition with U.S. exchanges or the
purchase of foreign exchanges by U.S. entities were understood to trigger the revocation
of the no action approval and the requirement that those exchanges register as a U.S.
exchange contract market fully regulated by the CFTC.
As the oil futures and derivatives market is now postured, the New York Mercantile
Exchange (“Nymex”) and the Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”) are the major
recognized futures and derivatives trading exchanges. Nymex is regulated by the CFTC
as a traditional contract market under the relaxed standards established for those
exchanges under the CFMA.50 However, Nymex is required to provide large trading
positions to the CFTC. Indeed, it is the daily assessment of the trading on Nymex that has
been the basis of assurances by CFTC commissioners and Nymex itself that the CFTC
has a complete grasp on data that would reveal manipulation in each of the oil futures
markets.51
Unfortunately, however, despite being “Atlanta-based,” ICE’s domestic energy futures
trading is authorized only by the FBOT no action letters.52 Accordingly, as its no action
letter specifies, ICE’s principal regulator is the U.K. Financial Services Authority – not
the CFTC.53 When the IPE was purchased by the ICE in 2001, the CFTC, despite
approving four subsequent ICE requested no action adjustments, never required that
exchange to become a U.S. regulated contract market. Indeed, this is so even though it
has been widely reported that ICE has transferred the bulk of its oil trading from open
outcry pits in the U.K. to computerized trading terminals located in Atlanta.54
In February 2006, ICE began trading a futures vehicle in direct competition with what
had theretofore been Nymex’s signature and exclusive oil futures contract: the West
Texas Intermediate crude oil contract (“WTI”). In a very short period, ICE has
reportedly garnered a 25% market share of WTI volume.55
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As a result of complaints by Nymex with regard to the regulatory disparity between it and
ICE,56 the CFTC staff informed ICE on January 31, 2006 that, while it would allow ICE
to continue to function under the FBOT no action letter, the CFTC “will be evaluating
the use of the no-action process in light of the significant issues raised by” the listing of
its WTI contract, which “may impact whether ICE . . .will be able to rely on the . . . . . no
action letter” in the future.57 On April 26, 2006, the CFTC issued an order giving that
agency more time to act upon future FBOT contract designation requests and repealing
its earlier order requiring mere notice before the trading of new FBOT contracts.58
Whatever the status of Nymex and ICE, it is clear that what is indisputably a substantial
segment of this market, OTC oil derivatives trading, is opaque to the federal government
because of the CFMA. We know from the Western electricity manipulation that OTC
energy markets can be the essential source of manipulation, because they are hidden from
public view. Indeed, the OTC energy derivatives market is doubly opaque, because it
has attracted hundreds of hedge funds,59 i.e., lightly regulated financial institutions
trading wholly unregulated financial products.
In this regard, the Industrial Energy Consumers of America (“IECA”) has calculated that
over 90% of the trading volume in these markets derives from individuals or entities that
have no relationship to energy industries.60 If IECA is right, that means the
overwhelming part of this market is driven not by hedging, but by speculation.
Moreover, one major player in this market, ICE, who (like Nymex) would otherwise
unmistakably fall under the regulatory ambit of the CFMA, is not even directly regulated
by the U.S. government. The CFTC continues to allow this U.S. company, whose
electronic trading facilities are largely based in Atlanta, to be regulated by U.K.
authorities. Moreover, the CFTC is not even aggressively pursuing its rights under ICE’s
no action letter to obtain directly from ICE on a regular basis trading data pertaining to
the oil markets; nor is the CFTC apparently using its information sharing agreement with
the U.K. regulator, the FSA, to examine ICE oil trading.
Finally, while Nymex does provide the CFTC with large trader reporting data, an
examination of market manipulation cannot completely overlook careful examination of
that exchange. It must be remembered that Representatives Graves (R.-Mo.) and Barrow
(D.-Ga.) convinced the House of Representatives to mandate in its own CFTC
Reauthorization Act (H.R. 4473) aggressive CFTC scrutiny of the natural gas markets.
That measure was driven in considerable part because of widespread complaints that
56
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Nymex’s daily trading “limits” rules (as well as the CFTC’s oversight of them) were
deemed to be unusually weak and, according to many traders’ and end users’ complaints,
encouraged extraordinary volatility in Nymex’s natural gas futures contracts.61 Again, as
mentioned earlier62, the CFMA encourages the most passive CFTC oversight of the even
the most regulated contract markets, and the House bill as passed affirmatively addresses
that problem insofar as natural gas trading is concerned.
Members of this Committee have proposed the introduction of an “Energy Market
Transparency Amendment” to the Senate’s pending “Commodity Exchange
Authorization Act.” That proposal would require the CFTC to order the reporting of
positions relating energy commodity contracts (and the routine maintenance of data
pertinent thereto) traded on any “electronic trading facility” (including contracts on the
domestic terminals of FBOT’s such as ICE). This proposal would substantially remedy
the “loopholes” created either by the CFMA or by CFTC inaction that have made so
much of the energy futures and derivatives transactions opaque to U.S. regulators and the
American public. Again, it may very well be that “economic fundamentals” are
exclusively causing soaring gasoline prices. But, a judgment about causation in this
regard should not be left to guess work. Given the experience with the Western states
electricity manipulation, any sensible person owes it to themselves to be sure that the
American public is paying high gas prices because it is economically mandated and not
because it is financially advantageous to isolated economic interests.
In closing, it is important to answer clearly arguments that have been advanced by the
CFTC and financial institutions opposing this kind of common sense inquiry into energy
futures and derivatives markets.
1.

61

CFTC Commissioners have argued that they are already looking closely at
Nymex data, which tells them all that they need to know about energy market
manipulation.63 But, as shown above, Nymex is only one piece of this puzzle.
It appears that ICE data is not being sought on a systematic basis by the CFTC
even though it has a right to do so. Certainly, OTC energy trading data is not
regularly being made available to that agency.64 It is more than obvious that if
there is manipulation, the wrongdoing is least likely to take place on the one
exchange that is providing the CFTC with trading data on a daily basis, i.e.,
Nymex. As the American Public Power Association has so aptly stated:
“Affiliated traders can be active in the same set of markets, with one taking a
position on Nymex while the other holds OTC contracts. For this reason, the
CFTC cannot assess a given trader’s overall level of investment in gas
markets or positions take in one may affect the trader’s overall position.”65
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2.

It is further argued that the CFTC is already undertaking a series of
investigations of specific incidents within the broader oil futures and
derivatives markets. It is claimed that those investigations make broader data
collection unnecessary.66 However, as the Industrial Energy Consumers of
America have pointed out, looking at isolated complaints of manipulation
does not substitute for a global understanding of these markets.67 The CFTC
would not exchange daily large trader reporting from Nymex for random and
isolated investigations of individualized complaints on that exchange. CFTC
officials proudly proclaim the importance of daily Nymex data collection.68 In
the present gas crisis, what is beneficial for Nymex surveillance is beneficial
for the market as whole.

3.

Another CFTC Commissioner cites the CFTC’s collection of fines for
electricity manipulation within the OTC energy markets as evidence of the
“transparency” of those markets to the CFTC.69 Again, as the ICEA points
out, the electricity manipulation investigations were “reactive” and only
undertaken when the manipulation “became an obvious problem.”70 Indeed, as
shown above, the CFTC only agreed to undertake a thorough electricity
manipulation investigation when private parties voluntarily disclosed Enron
documents that evinced straightforward, widespread, and crass manipulation
tactics.71 Moreover, the fines ultimately collected by the CFTC were paltry
compared to the economic damage suffered.72

4.

The same CFTC Commissioner “worr[ies] a little bit about a data dump on the
CFTC” emanating from trading inquiries into the OTC energy markets.73
Having gone through an aggressive “special call” of hedge funds data relating
to OTC forex markets during the Long Term Capital Management failure in
October 1998, I can testify first hand to the ability of the CFTC staff to handle
large amounts of data of this nature. Moreover, if these inquiries were to
uncover manipulation or even provide assurance that there is no wrongdoing,
responding to a “data dump” would have been a small price for the CFTC to
pay.

5.

Finally, opponents of OTC market investigations continually argue that
regulatory oversight of these markets undercuts the underlying deregulatory
purposes of the CFMA, which is cited as the underpinning for remarkable
financial growth in these markets. While there can be no gainsaying that these
markets have thrived on deregulation, it is also true that the public has paid a
high price for this legislation. Since the CFMA has passed we have, for
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example, seen the failure of Enron ( the foremost proponent and user of the
exemptions within the CFMA) and many other major energy trading
companies; the Western electricity crisis; and the collapse of the FCM Refco,
causing the fourteenth largest bankruptcy in American history. The OTC
energy markets have been so shaken that even the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association was required to do a study entitled: “Restoring
Confidence in U.S. Energy Trading Markets”74 after the Enron and electricity
manipulation debacles. Moreover, the New York Fed has informally
mandated strict self regulation in other sectors of the OTC markets to
overcome sloppy record keeping by OTC traders. 75 A recent high powered
banking self study of that market was highly critical of this kind of careless
and shoddy OTC record keeping.76 In short, while the CFMA may have
profited banks, brokers, and hedge funds, the American public has paid a high
price for this deregulatory effort. The so-called “glories” of the CFMA should
not interfere with ensuring the protection of the American consumer during
this highly destabilizing gas price crisis.
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